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Case Note 
Discussion Interrupted: The Destruction and Protection of Cultural Property under 
international law and the case of Prosecutor v Al Mahdi 
 
 
‘The awareness of beauty will save the world’ 
Nicholas Roerich1 
 
 
Abstract  
Al Mahdi was the first case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) which focused on 
the destruction of cultural property, and indeed, the first case before an international criminal 
tribunal which had the destruction of cultural property as the sole charge against a jihadist. 
Despite the many legal sources which seek to regulate attacks on cultural property, the exact 
contours of the offence are unclear, especially with regard to the rationales for protection and 
prosecution. Some international instruments seek to prohibit attacks on cultural property 
because such property constitutes civilian property, while other instruments highlight the 
need to protect cultural property as a result of its importance to humanity. In addition, the 
case of Al Mahdi also opened up the issue of justifications for attacks on cultural property as 
Al Mahdi was a member of the Hisbah, or ‘morality brigade’ in Timbuktu, which had 
justified the attacks in accordance with Islamic law. In this context, the question arises if 
membership of the Hisbah could have been seen as a justification for the attacks on cultural 
property in Mali? This case note first addresses the international legal framework on the 
protection of cultural property in Section 2. Section 3 then assesses the concept of Hisbah and 
its operation, including the reasons why the Hisbah group in Mali destroyed cultural 
property. The next section considers the facts of the Al Mahdi case. Section 5 highlights the 
shortfalls in the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the rationales for the protection and 
destruction of cultural property, before the note concludes in Section 6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Nicholas Roerich Museum website, available at: <http://www.roerich.org/roerich-pact.php>. 
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I Introduction 
The case of Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, centring on charges of directing attacks against cultural 
property2 in Mali, has recently been completed before the ICC. One of the hallmarks of the 
Malian conflict was the destruction of cultural landmarks, including internationally protected 
cultural property in the historic city of Timbuktu, by Islamist extremist groups.3 Al Mahdi 
was the first case before the ICC which focused on the destruction of cultural property, and 
indeed, the first case before an international criminal tribunal which had the destruction of 
cultural property as the sole charge against a jihadist. The international legal framework 
concerning the protection of cultural property is contained in a variety of international legal 
instruments and has been elaborated on in decisions of international criminal tribunals. In 
addition, attacks on cultural property are also prohibited by customary international law. 
Despite the many legal sources which seek to regulate attacks on cultural property, the exact 
contours of the offence are unclear, especially with regard to the rationales for protection and 
prosecution. Some international instruments seek to prohibit attacks on cultural property 
because such property constitutes civilian property, while other instruments highlight the 
need to protect cultural property as a result of its importance to humanity. In addition, the 
case of Al Mahdi also opened up the issue of justifications for attacks on cultural property as 
Al Mahdi was a member of the Hisbah, or ‘morality brigade’ in Timbuktu, which had 
justified the attacks in accordance with Islamic law. Al Mahdi himslef believed he was doing 
what is right and that he was under a divine obligation to forbid wrong. While some views the 
present case will deter other Islamist extremism groups in Syria, Iraq and Libya who 
systematically have begun destroing historic shrines and cultural property others view such 
destruction as simply a different “vision” of “good over evil”. Al Mahdi defence lawyer went 
further arguing that the present case refeclts an emerging ‘clash between tow world views, 
part of a broader struggle over the meaning of Islam.’ It was hoped that this case would allow 
for an in-depth discussion of these issues, however, Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the charges 
against him and thus the trial was truncated. The Trial Chamber undertook only a very 
superficial consideration of the relevant legal framework and did not dwell on the issue of the 
Hisbah in any depth, leaving numerous questions concerning the protection of cultural 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the distinction between cultural property and cultural heritage, see Manlio Frigo, ‘Cultural 
property v cultural heritage: A ‘battle of concepts’ in international law?’ (2004) 86 IRRC 367. 
3 The conflict ‘is a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse 
actors and groups’ for which there was no one single cause. See David J. Francis, ‘The regional impact of the 
armed conflict and French intervention in Mali’ (2013) Report for the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 
Centre, 2. 
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property in international law, including the rationales for its protection and destruction, 
unanswered. The decision was, therefore, unsatisfactory on many counts.  This article first 
addresses the international legal framework on the protection of cultural property in Section 
2. Section 3 then assesses the concept of Hisbah and its operation, including the reasons why 
the Hisbah group in Mali destroyed cultural property. The next section considers the facts of 
the Al Mahdi case. Section 5 highlights the shortfalls in the Trial Chamber’s consideration of 
the rationales for the protection and destruction of cultural property, before the article 
concludes in Section 6. 
 
II The Protection of Cultural Property under International Law 
A International Law Approaches to the Protection of Cultural Property 
One may ask why is cultural property protected under international law and why do attacks 
on cultural property fall within the remit of the ICC? A review of the relevant legal 
provisions seems to provide different answers to these questions. 
 
The requirement to protect cultural property in international law can be traced back to 19th 
century instruments such as the Lieber Code 1863,4 the 1874 Declaration of Brussels,5 the 
1880 Oxford Code,6 and the Hague Regulations 1899.7 In the twentieth century, Articles 27 
                                                 
4 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Prepared by Francis Lieber, 
promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24 April 1863. Article 34 states: ‘As a general 
rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable 
character, to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public 
schools, universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific 
character such property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may be taxed 
or used when the public service may require it.’ 
5 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, signed at Brussels, 27 
August 1874. On military authority over hostile territory. Article 8 states: ‘The property of municipalities, that 
of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences even when State property, shall 
be treated as private property. All seizure or destruction of, or wilful damage to, institutions of this character, 
historic monuments, works of art and science should be made the subject of legal proceedings by the competent 
authorities.’ 
6 The Laws of War on Land, Manual published by the Institute of International Law (Oxford Manual), adopted 
by the Institute of International Law at Oxford, September 9, 1880. Article 53 states: ‘The property of 
municipalities, and that of institutions devoted to religion, charity, education, art and science, cannot be seized. 
All destruction or wilful damage to institutions of this character, historic monuments, archives, Works of art, or 
science, is formally forbidden, save when urgently demanded by military necessity.’ 
7 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899. Article 56 states: ‘The property of the 
communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science, even when 
State property, shall be treated as private property. All seizure of and destruction, or intentional damage done to 
such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited, and should be made the subject 
of proceedings.’ 
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and 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations of 19078 were adopted, also seeking to protect cultural 
property. Furthermore, the 1919 Commission on Responsibility identified ‘wanton 
destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments’ as a 
war crime.9 The rationale for the protection of cultural property in all of these instruments is 
the status of cultural objects as non-military or civilian objects and the basic international 
humanitarian law principle of distinction requires that civilian objects not be the subject of 
attack.10 In these instruments the protection of cultural property is paralleled with the 
protection of other civilian objects, such as hospitals and religious sites.  
 
However, other international instruments reflect a different rationale for the protection of 
cultural property,11 and recognise that a requirement for the protection of such property is 
incumbent upon the international community due to its importance to humanity. This 
approach is clearly seen in the Hague Convention of 1954, whose Preamble states that 
‘damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the 
cultural heritage of all mankind.’12 This Convention was updated by means of two 
                                                 
8 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Articles 27 and 56. 
9 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, (1920) AJIL 14, 
95, 115.   
10 International Committee of the Red Cross Customary IHL Rule 7 states: ‘The parties to the conflict must at all 
times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military 
objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.’ Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-
Beck, Customary Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2005). See 
Customary IHL Database, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-
law.  
11 While the Roerich Pact does not set out a rationale for the protection of cultural property, the previous work 
of the initiator, Nicholas Roerich, in bringing States together to protect such property illustrates his belief that 
‘the cultural heritage of each nation is in essence a world treasure.’ See Nicholas Roerich Museum website, 
available at: http://www.roerich.org/roerich-pact.php. The Roerich Pact was signed in the White House, in the 
presence of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on April 15, 1935, by all the members of the Pan-American 
Union. It was later signed by other countries also. 
12 Preamble, Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, adopted 
at The Hague, 1954. Article 1 of this instrument defines cultural property as ‘any movable or immovable 
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of all people, such as monuments of architecture or history, 
archaeological sites, works of art, books or any building whose main and effective purpose is to contain cultural 
property.’ However, the Convention also focused on the nature of cultural property as civilian property and 
provided that cultural property could only be attacked in case of ‘imperative military necessity’. In 1977, 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions modified this approach and provided that only military 
objectives should be made the object of attack. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
Article 53; See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 16. Both of these 
protocols make reference to an earlier 1954 Hague Convention. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, adopted at The 
Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 4.  Note that the issue of cultural property did not feature in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.  
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protocols,13 strengthening the emphasis on contribution of cultural property to humanity. 
Instruments on cultural property adopted by UNESCO also highlight the need to protect such 
property because of its importance to all of humankind.14 
Thus, as stated by Frulli, we can appreciate two ways of understanding attacks on cultural 
property in international instruments; the first is the ‘civilian use’ approach and the second is 
the ‘culture-value’ approach.15 International customary law recognises both approaches, with 
IHL Customary Rule 38 stating: 
A. Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historic 
monuments unless they are military objectives. 
B. Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people must not be 
the object of attack unless imperatively required by military necessity.16 
 
While customary international law recognises both protection rationales, practice on this 
issue from international criminal tribunals17 has illustrated a blurring of this binary protective 
framework. This can be clearly seen at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), as the Tribunal has broadened its discussion on this issue from a civilian 
use approach to a culture-value approach over time.  Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute 
includes among the violations of the laws or customs of war in respect of which the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction ‘seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art 
and science’,18 thus indicating a civilian use approach. However, in practice, the Tribunal has 
taken a much broader approach, focusing on the inextricable connection between a people 
and its culture. For example, it equated destruction of places of worship with persecution as a 
                                                 
13 First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, 
adopted at The Hague, 14 May 1954 and Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, adopted at The Hague, 26 March 1999.  
14 See UNESCO instruments on cultural property, available at: <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13649&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html>. 
15 Michaela Frulli, ‘The Criminalization of Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The 
Quest for Consistency’ (2011) 22(1) The European Journal of International Law 22(1), 203. 
16 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules, 
ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2005. See Customary IHL Database, available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law.  
17 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Art. 4(f)) and the Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (Art. 3(f)) mentions only pillage as a war crime related to cultural property. Article 7 of the 
Law on the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia provides for prosecution pursuant to the provisions of the 
1954 Hague Convention.  
18 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by 
Resolution 827, as amended 7 July 2009 by Resolution 1877. 
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crime against humanity because it amounted to ‘an attack on the very religious identity of a 
people’.19 Furthermore, in the case of Kristić, the Tribunal considered that the destruction of 
mosques showed an attempt to erase the identity of the group and, as such, that it constituted 
‘evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group’.20 Thus, attacks against cultural 
property have been viewed as both crimes against humanity and as evidence of genocide by 
the ICTY, not just as war crimes as envisioned by its Statute. Martínez concludes that ‘the 
ICTY has consistently included the destruction of cultural and religious heritage within the 
facts constituting the widespread and systematic attack against civilian populations. 
Regarding the crime of persecution, the destruction or damage of the cultural heritage must 
be related to the intent to discriminate and, when the destroyed or damaged heritage is 
exclusively valuable for one specific population, the ICTY has consistently affirmed that 
such destruction is de facto discriminatory.’21 
 
In addition to broadening out attacks on cultural property to the realm of crimes against 
humanity and genocide, the ICTY also broadened out the categories of cultural property to be 
protected. Brammertz, Hughes, Kipp and Tomljanovich Abst, discussing the cases of Prlić 
and Others22 and Hadžihasanović and Kubura,23 point out that ‘while conventional 
humanitarian law recognizes two categories of protection, international criminal law appears 
to recognize three.’ 24 In addition to protecting cultural property due to its nature as civilian 
property, the ICTY also sought to protect ‘institutions dedicated to religion, charity and 
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science’, as well as 
cultural property of ‘great importance’. Therefore, the categories of cultural property 
deserving protection under international criminal law remains unclear and in need of 
clarification. Given that Al Mahdi was the first case to be heard before an international 
criminal tribunal  focusing exclusively on the protection of cultural property, it was hoped 
that some clarification on this issue would be forthcoming. 
 
B The Protection of Cultural Property and the Rome Statute 
                                                 
19 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerzek, IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 207. 
20 Prosecutor v Kristić IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 508. 
21 See Sebastián A Green Martínez, ‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali’ (2016) 13(5) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1, 14. 
22 (IT-04-74-T), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, Vol. I, para. 172 
23 Hadžihasanović and Kubura Trial Judgment, paras. 57-64. 
24 Serge Brammertz, Kevin C. Hughes, Alison Kipp and William B. Tomljanovich Abst, ‘Attacks against 
Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War. Prosecutions at the ICC’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 14(5), 1143, 1154. 
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Despite the use of the culture-value approach in the 1954 Hague Convention and the 
customary law rule on the destruction of cultural property, the Rome Statute limits itself  to 
“a civilian use rationale” for the protection of cultural property. According to Article 
8(2)(e)(iv), ‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives’ in non-
international armed conflicts is a war crime. The destruction of cultural property in 
international armed conflicts is also classified as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ix). 
However, as stated above, despite the wording of its Statute, the ICTY took a culture-value 
approach to the protection of cultural property in its jurisprudence. A similar broad 
interpretative approach from the ICC would be welcome as we will discuss below.  
 
III The Hisbah under Islamic Law 
A Al Mahdi and the Hisbah 
The destruction of cultural property in Mali was undertaken under the auspices of the Hisbah, 
a morality police charged with eradicating vice in Mali set up by Islamist extremist groups, of 
which Al Mahdi was the leader. During its preliminary examination of the Situation in Mali 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) reported that as of around 17 January 2012, a non-
international armed conflict was ongoing in the territory of Mali between the government 
forces and a number of organised armed groups, including the Mouvement National de 
Libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA), al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le 
jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO) and 
‘Arab militias’.25  
 
It is thought that Al Mahdi, also known as Abu Turab, was born in Timbuktu in Mali.26 His 
family is recognised for having an expertise in Islam27 and he himself received Qur’anic 
                                                 
25 Other Islamist groups, such as Boko Haram, are also active in the region according to some reports. ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali, Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013, at para 29. Available at: 
<http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0112/Documents/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicRep
ortENG16Jan2013.pdf>. 
26 It is also thought that he is currently between 30 and 40 years of age. First Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-54-
Conf-AnxA, p. 3 (fact 10).   
27 Defence witness statement, MLI-DEF-0001-0001, 0002.   
8 
 
education since his childhood and gave lectures as an expert on religious matters.28 He joined 
Ansar Dine29 in April 2012.30 During the Trial, it was held that, until September 2012, he was 
the head of the Hisbah, and that he was involved in various ways in the destruction of 
valuable cultural property. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the mission of the Hisbah was 
‘to prevent apparent vice and to promote virtue as well as to carry out charitable tasks.’31 It 
therefore fell to the Hisbah in Mali to deliberate on the fate of the religious sites subsequently 
attacked in Timbuktu. The Hisbah was tasked with ‘the prevention of anything that can be 
considered as worshipping the tombs, such as building the dome over the tomb.’32 In this 
context, the question arises if membership of the Hisbah could have been seen as a 
justification for the attacks on cultural property in Mali? 
 
The concept of Hisbah is derived from the Qur’anic verse 3:104 which instructs Muslims to 
command good and forbid evil (al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar) and is 
considered as ‘a cardinal Qur’anic principle which lies at the root of many Islamic laws and 
institutions.’33  According to Al-Ghazali what amounts exactly to good (ma‘ruf) or evil 
(munkar) is to be determined with reference to Shari‘a, ‘in particular to those rules that 
pertain to the protection of the five values, namely, life, faith, intellect, property and 
lineage.’34 The Mīlikī jurist, al-Qarafī set out the following three conditions which must be 
observed in the implementation of hisbah and are considered the basic guidelines governing 
the activity of the muhtasib (the person who bids good or forbids evil). (i) The muhtasib must 
act from a position of knowledge, since an ignorant individual who is not sure of his grounds 
may neither enjoin good nor forbid evil. (ii) The muhtasib must be reasonably sure that their 
attempts at prevention do not give rise to a greater evil. (iii) The muhtasib must act on the 
basis of an overwhelming probability (al-zann al-ghalīb) that the attempt to enjoin good or 
forbid evil is likely to achieve the direct result.35 Element (ii) above restricts the 
                                                 
28 Statement by Al Mahdi, MLI-OTP-0033-4511, 4523-25; Defence witness statement, MLI-DEF-0002-0001, 
0001-02.   
29 Ansar Dine is a mainly Tuareg movement associated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ‘AQIM’. 
30 First Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-54-Conf-AnxA, pp. 2 and 3 (facts 3-13).   
31 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 2016, 
para 46. 
32 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 2016, 
para 47. 
33 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society 2010)  28. 
The principle of ‘enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong’ is reiterated in verse 3:110. 
34 Muhammad Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazālī, Ihyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, vol. II (2nd edn., Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1980)  324 cited 
in Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam  ibid, 33.  
35 Shihāb al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī, Kitāb al-Furūq vol. IV (Cairo: Matba‘at Dār Ihyā’ al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyyah, 1346 
A.H) 255 cited in Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 33.  
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implementation of hisbah to situations where the evil conduct and crimes are being 
committed so that ‘the muhtasib is in a position to prevent it, or to bring about a change to an 
on-going situation.’36 If one of either of the first two conditions is absent, according to al-
Qarafī, this would render hisbah illegitimate. On the other hand, the absence of the last 
condition downgrades hisbah from an obligation (wājib/an obligation or duty arising from the 
decisive injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah) into a mere permissibility (mubāh).37  
 
A further debate that has preoccupied the early Muslim jurists (‘ullama) was whether hisbah 
is a collective duty (fard kafā’ī), or an individual obligation (fard ‘ayni) which should be 
performed by every Muslim. According to Ibn Kathir, verse 3:104 asserts that although 
hisbah is incumbent on each member of the Ummah, i.e. the Muslim community or society as 
a whole, to the extent of one’s ability, this task should be fulfilled by a specific segment of 
the Ummah.38 It has been argued that hisbah becomes an individual obligation and the 
personal responsibility of the individual concerned only in one situation ‘when there is only 
one person in the entire community, or when a single individual witnesses evil being 
committed.’39 In all other situations/capacities, it remains a collective duty of the community 
as a whole.  
 
The dual characterisation of hisbah as both rights and duties are recognised in the 1981 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) under Article 4 ‘The Right to 
Justice.’ 40 Paragraph (c) of this provision explicitly defines hisbah as ‘the right and duty of 
every person to defend the rights of any other person and the community in general’. As 
noted by Kamali, ‘whether collective or individual, hisbah has been generally charactarised 
as an obligation.’41  
 
According to the following hadīth (oral traditions attributed to Prophet Muhammad), 
believers are encouraged to carry out hisbah in accordance with their ability and to the extent 
that circumstances permitted in at least three ways: ‘Whoever among you sees an evil action, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society 2010)  28. 
36 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Right to Life, Security, Privacy and Ownership in Islam (Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society 2008) 183.   
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibn Kathir, Tafsir ibn Kathir, Vol., 2, p. 233 
39 Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 29.  
40 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the Islamic Council of Europe on 19 September 
1981/21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 available online at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/islamic_declaration_HR.html  
41 Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 29 
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let him change it with his hand (by taking action); if he cannot, then with his tongue (by 
speaking out); and if he cannot, then with his heart (by hating it and feeling it is wrong), and 
that is the weakest of faith.’42 It is clear that the hadith commands physical action, and it is 
not this part of literal interpretation by groups such as Ansar Dine or ISIS which is 
problematic. What is problematic is the broad interpretation of what is considered ‘evil’, 
combined with jihadists’ interpretation ‘which turns use of the hand into a strict ideology of 
hisbah applied to all spheres of life, especially public piety’.43 If “evil” were interpreted as, 
for example, an attack on an innocent person, then preventing that physically would pose no 
problem. However, when “evil” is interpreted as any deviation from moral rules, even when 
affecting only the person itself, it goes beyond the idea of God’s judgement in such matters. 
For example, physical punishment of someone for not wearing the ‘right’ length of trousers is 
clearly interpreting “evil” too broadly. 
It has been argued that putting things right (taghyir) with the hand is the prerogative 
of political authorities, with the tongue of scholars and in (or with) the heart for the common 
people.44 ‘This elitist interpretation’ according to Cook and Meijer ‘confirms the state’s 
monopoly of force and the ‘natural’ hierarchical structure of society.’45  
 
As a function of the state, hisbah was instituted from early Abbasid Caliphate, whereby the 
caliph or sultan would appoint a muhtasib, i.e. the chief of municipal administration and 
policing with three main functions: policing of markets; monitoring the state of the roads and 
buildings in the city; and enforcement of public morals.46 The muhtasib stood between the 
qadi and the police47 and generally had to be ‘a faqih [someone with an understanding of fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence)], aware of the rules of Islamic law so as to know what to order and 
what to forbid’.48 They were able to force debtors to honour their debts and to take other 
actions that did not require formal hearings or verdicts.49  
                                                 
42 Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, Vol, 1, no, 177, pp.143-144. 
43 Chaplain (Maj.) Seth H. George, U.S. Army, “Commanding the Right: Islamic Morality and Why It Matters” 
in Military Review, September-October 2016, p. 63. 
44 Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4, 11-12.  
45 Roel Meijer, ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as Principle of Social Action: The Case of the 
Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya’ in Roel Meijer (ed.) Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement 
(Columbia University Press 2009) 191 citing Cook, ibid.  
46 Sami Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 59 
47 Knut S. Vikor, Between God and the Sultan: a Historical Introduction to Islamic Law (London: Hurst, 2004), 
197. 
48 ʻAbd al-Rahmān b. Nasr al-Shayzarī, The Book of the Islamic Market Inspector: Nihayat al-Rutba fi Talab al-
Hisbah (the Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of Hisbah), translated with an introduction and notes by R. P. 
Buckley (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 28. 
49 Ibn Khaldun, supra note 23 at vol. 1, 463. 
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The term hisbah was mentioned in the Qur’an only in the meaning of a volunteer and it is 
thus fair to say that by making it an official religious post, the Abbasside Caliph transformed 
the concept into a political tool to get rid of any potential enemies and to portray himself as a 
defender of the faith.50 Enforcing hisbah should not involve greater mischief than the one that 
is to be prevented.51 There can be little doubt that widespread accusations, persecutions, 
pillaging and killing based on peoples’ beliefs or purported lack thereof brings unparalleled 
harm to a society as well as the religion itself. The Qur’an clearly states in verse 2:256 that 
there is no compulsion in religion, therefore forcing it on people through violent intimidation 
goes directly against this. 
  
B The Current Use of Hisbah 
There are numerous examples of hisbah being used by states, extremist groups and courts to 
impose apostasy sentences such as the one declared by the Supreme Shari’a Court of Sudan 
against al-Amin Da’ud Mohammed Taha. The point of interest here is that the litigants used 
hisbah as the grounds for their legal action against Taha, calling successfully on the court to 
declare Taha’s ridda (apostasy) or to consider him as a murtad (apostate).52 
 
A similar example of a court’s use of hisbah was a 1995 Egyptian case involving Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zayd, an Arabic literature lecturer at Cairo University. Abu Zayd’s promotion was 
blocked by Dr. ‘Abd al-Sabur Shahin, a member of the review committee, who issued a 
declaration of apostasy stating that Zaid’s work offended Islam.53 Dr. Shahin’s counsel 
argued that on the basis of the concept of hisbah they could file a lawsuit against Zayd.54 The 
court deemed that society had a ‘direct interest in filling a hisbah suit’.55 
 
                                                 
50 Ahmed Mansour, ‘Hisbah: A Historical Overview’, Ahl AlQuran, International Quranic Center, 
http://www.ahl-alquran.com/English/show_article.php?main_id=125 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
51 Kamarudin bin Ahmad, ‘Wilayat Al-Hisbah; A Means to Achieve Justice and Maintain High Ethical 
Standards in Societies’, 6 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4 (2015), 205. 
52 Mohamed A. Mahmoud, Quest For Divinity: a Critical Examination of the Thought of Mahmud Muhammad 
Taha (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 22. 
53 Susanne Olsson, ‘Apostasy in Egypt: Contemporary Cases of Hisbah’, 98 The Muslim World (2008), 95-115, 
104. 
54 Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 46. 
55 Cairo Court of Appeals, case no. 287 (1995) in Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, 
Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 49. 
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Hisbah was considered a significant obligation by the Egyptian terrorist group al-Jama‘a al-
Islamiyya/Tanzim al-jihad (the Jama‘a) and an effective tool to ‘change reality’.56 The 
Jama‘a took the interpretation of what is ‘changing the forbidden/reprehensible’ (taghyir al-
munkar) from the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya.57 In extreme cases, according to Ibn 
Taymiyya it was the right of every subject to exert hisbah and to use force without the 
sanction of the state.’58 The Jama‘a was also influenced by the work of the classical scholar al 
Nawawai who asserted that hisbah is not merely confined to the Islamic authority (al-sulta 
al-muslima) but also those who are legally responsible (mukallaf) have the right to exert 
hisbah.59   When the Jama‘a linked hisbah with the necessity to completely submit to God’s 
sovereignty (the concept of tawhid al-rubibyya) it become an activist programme of changing 
evil by force.60 Their adherence to the concept of hakimiyya ‘which made it imperative to rise 
up in revolt against the ruler who does not rule in accordance with the revelation’ was the 
main imperative to declare Sadat an unbeliever and subsequently assassinate him.61  
 
Likewise, the self-decalred Islamic State (ISIS/Da‘esh) considers declarations of takfir 
(‘accusing someone, especially a fellow Muslim, of kufr [unbelief]: holding or expressing 
deviant views or committing actions indicative of unbelief that may be tantamount to 
apostasy (ridda, irtidād) and can result in his excommunication from the fold of Islam or even 
execution’)62  to fall within its list of duties. ISIS has its own Islamic police force (Diwan al-
Hisbah)63 to ensure compliance with hisbah’s requirements, which include investigating 
reports of drug or alcohol use and seizing such forbidden items as musical instruments or 
polytheistic idols.64 ISIS has also made extensive use of hisbah against those they deem to be 
apostates. They hold that although faith amounts to an act of obedience, it is in and of itself 
insufficient and must be followed by action.65 As with the 7th century Khawarij sect, ISIS 
                                                 
56 Meijer, ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as Principle of Social Action’, n. 45, 205 
57 Ibid., 194.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid., 205 
60 Ibid., 194.  
61 Ibid., 196.  
62 Camilla Adang et al. (eds.), Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr, (Leiden, 
Boston: Brill, 2016) 1.   
63 Hussein Solomon, Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation, (London: Palgrave, 2016) 4 
64 Andrew F. March and Mara Revkin, ‘Caliphate of Law’, Foreign Affairs (15th April 2015), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphate-law (accessed 21 September 2016). 
65 ISIS claims that even reciting the shahadah (There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is his messenger) is not 
enough: ‘Speech will not benefit you without action, for there is no faith without action.’ 
See supra note 3 at ‘A New Audio Message by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ~ March Forth whether Light or Heavy’. 
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believes that unbelievers’ blood and property can be taken away with impunity.66 Such 
missuse of hibah by ISIS was condemned by a wide assortment of scholars from the Middle 
East in a recent letter addressed to al-Baghdadi.67  
 
C Visitation of Mausoleums (Ziyara): Is it Prohibited under Islamic Law?  
As mentioned, one of the activities which the Hisbah in Mali focused on was the destruction 
of cultural property. In this context, the concept of ziyara, (literally ‘visitation’, an act which 
encompasses the visitation of such places as tombs, mausoleums and shrines) under Islamic 
law must be analysed. The act of ziyara is a controversial practice amongst Muslims. While it 
is a strong tradition among Shi‘ite Muslims to go on pilgrimages to Al-Najaf and Karbala 
where the graves of Ali ibn Abi Talib (600 – c.661) and of Husayn ibn Ali (624-680) are 
respectively located, the Wahhabis have consistently denounced the veneration of saints due 
to its overtones of polytheism, going so far as to destroy these shrines in the 19th century. The 
difference of opinion regarding ziyara stems partly from the lack of Qur’anic sources and 
partly from ambiguous Prophetic Traditions (hadiths) which intermittently condemn68 and 
advocate ziayarat al-qubur (visitation of graves).69 Regarding the specific issue of images 
and idols depicted by the Qur’an as a ‘means by which people have been led astray’70, none 
of its 6,236 verses actually prescribe the destruction of idols. However, verses 21:56-57 
narrate, without condemning, the actual breaking of idols by Abraham in order to guide his 
people to the oneness of God.71 As to the Prophet’s deeds, while he first forbade this practice 
at a time when the principle of tawhid (Oneness of God) was not yet solidly established and 
visiting tombs was associated with the widespread jahiliyya72 practice of worshipping idols as 
well as Christian and Jewish rites, he is reported to have then encouraged his followers to 
                                                 
66 The Sea of Precious Virtues (Bahr al-Fava’id ): a Medieval Islamic Mirror for Princes, translated from the 
Persian, edited and annotated by Julie Scott Meisami (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), 106; 
Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo, Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi (Dar Dawat al-Basheer for 
Publications, 1999),  168; W. Montgomery Watt, ‘Conditions of Membership of the Islamic Community’, 21 
Studia Islamica 21  (1964):5-12, 7. 
67 Open Letter to Al Baghdadi, available at http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com  
68 Such as when, according to hadiths recorded by Muslim and al-Tirmidhi, the Prophet ordered ‘Ali to destroy 
elevated graves. 
69 ziayarat al-qubur specifically refers to the visitation of graves. 
70 Y. Mirza, ‘Abraham as an iconoclast: Understanding the destruction of ‘images’ through Qur’anic exegesis’ 
(2005) 16 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 427. 
71 Ibid., 416-417. 
72 Literally, ‘ignorance’, the term refers to the Pre-Islamic period. 
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visit tombs as a reminder of death and the afterlife.73 Thus it became not only permissible 
(mubah), but recommended (mustahab).74  
 
The authenticity of the hadiths recommending the visitation of tombs is nevertheless 
undermined by some scholars and debates have ensued concerning issues such as the height 
to which a grave may be erected or whether it was permissible for a woman to visit one. 
Controversies triggered after the Prophet’s death regarding the appropriate means and place 
of burial show that even from the early days of Islam, this issue was contentious.75 The main 
points of contention were the practice of praying at a gravesite and the levelling of graves to 
the ground (taswiyat al-qubur).76 
 
Examples from classical Islamic history exist of tombs being destroyed for political 
motivations, e.g. the desecration of Umayyad tombs by the early Abbasids,77 and of Abu 
Hanifa’s and Abu Yusuf’s tombs by the Safavids78 in the early 16th century. As pointed out 
by Emily Jane O’Dell, ‘[m]uch like suicide terrorism, “sacrificial” terrorism that targets 
heritage serves as an act of necropower against the state, as an act of resistance against the 
necropolitics of foreign intervention, and as an existential attack against the perceived power 
of the already dead—and even death itself. Waging war on the already dead attacks the 
heritage of the past, terrorizes the psyches of the living in the present, and restricts the rituals 
of the future.’79  
Scholarly reasoning and justifications of tomb destructions can be traced back to Ibn 
Taymiyya (1263-1328),80 a Syrian Hanbalite jurist and theologian, who condemned the 
widespread practice and went so far as to be detained until his death for issuing a fatwa (legal 
opinion) in which he stated that visiting graves, and specifically the Prophet’s grave, 
                                                 
73 Sahih Bukhari, Jana’iz, 2, Ahkam II; Sahih Muslim, Jana’iz, 15. 
74 According to a hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said ‘I had prohibited visiting graves for you. 
From now on you can visit graves’ (Sahih Muslim, vol. 4, p. 73, book of jana’iz). It is useful to note that 
under Islamic law, deeds are classified into five categories, namely obligatory (wajib), permitted (mubah), 
recommended (muhtasab), disapproved of but not unlawful (makruh) and forbidden (muharram). 
75 O. Beranek, P. Tupek, ‘From Visiting Graves to Their Destruction: The Question of Ziyara through the 
eyes of Salafis’ (2009) Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Crown Paper 2, 7 
76 According to Creswell, the principle of taswiyat al-qubur was observed until the third century of the 
Hijra when the Qubbat al-Sulaibiyya was built in Samarra; see K. A. C. Creswell, The Muslim 
Architecture of Egypt (Hacker Art Books, 1979), vol. 1, 111. 
77 Hugh Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate, A political History (Routledge, 2016), 48 
78 Saïd Amir Arjomand, Sociology of Shi’ite Islam: Collected Essays (Brill, 2016), 311 
79 E. J. O’Dell, ‘Waging War on the Dead: The Necropolitics of Sufi Shrine Destruction in Mali’ (2013) 9 
Journal of the World Archaeological Congress 518. 
80 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Clarendon Press, 2002) 63, 66, 72, 81 
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amounted to an innovation (bid‘a).81 Indeed he feared that new religions would arise from the 
worship of tombs. He thus challenged the authenticity of the hadiths that encouraged the 
visitation of graves. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the fact that it was not recommended to 
travel for the sole purpose of worship except for three places necessarily implied that it was 
forbidden.82 This view was not shared by other Hanbali scholars, such as Abd al-Ghani al-
Maqdisi, a prominent traditionalist hadith master, who held that the absence of an explicit 
recommendation to travel for the sole purpose of worship did not necessarily entail that it was 
forbidden.83 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s legacy ultimately influenced the cleric ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), 
founder of Wahhabism, a puritanical doctrine which advocated a return to the practice of the 
earliest generations of Islam (salaf al-salih). Going beyond the mere forbiddance of the 
visitation of tombs, the Wahhabi doctrine entailed physically ridding the Islamic world of all 
shrines and tombs which were considered to embody and sanction polytheism (shirk). 
Though this view did not find widespread adherence in the Arabian Peninsula, it was widely 
supported by Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud (1710-1765) who backed the ‘Abd al-Wahhab militarily. 
The latter’s absolute dedication to tawhid left no place for worship of anyone or anything 
other than God. Thus he undertook the destruction not only of Sufi or Shi’ite shrines, but of 
all shrines without distinction, as is portrayed by the demolition of the monument over Zayd 
ibn al-Khattab’s tomb (one of the Prophet’s Companions and the brother of the second Sunni 
Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab) which had been widely worshipped due to its connection to the 
early Muslims. In doing so, he sought to prevent the veneration of those buried in the tombs 
as he believed that it amounted to a violation of tawhid.  
 
Since then, the Wahhabis have been notorious for destroying tombs, such as that of Husayn 
ibn Ali84 in 1802. Although the Ottoman-Wahhabi war (1811-1818) led to the defeat of the 
Wahhabis by Muhammad Ali Pasha’s dynasty, Abd al-Aziz bin Sa’ud (r. 1926-1953) revived 
the Wahhabi-Saudi state and destroyed the shrines and tombs of the Jannat al-Baqi and Jannat 
                                                 
81 Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl ‘ala tabaqat al-hanabila (al-Riyad: Maktabat al-‘Ubaykan, 2005), vol. 4., p. 518. 
82 Ibn Taymiyya, Fatawa, vol. 4, p. 170; according to the hadith, the three places of worship were the 
Prophet’s mosque in Medina, the Haram mosque and the al-Aqsa mosque. For more on this tradition and 
its interpretation, see M. J. Kister, “You Shall Only Set Out for Three Mosques”, Le Muséon, LXXXII 
(1969). 
83 Ibn Taymiyya, Fatawa., vol. 20, p. 29 
84 Grandson of the Prophet and son of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. 
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al-Mu’alla cemeteries situated respectively in Medina and Mecca, where the Prophet’s family 
members and companions were buried. 
 
The destruction which have been recently witnessed in Syria, Mali and countless other places 
show that the impact of Wahhabism goes well beyond the sole borders of the Arabian 
Peninsula. In Mali the Salafist-Jihadist group Ansar Dine sought to forcibly establish an 
Islamic State based on strict Shari’a precepts. This included, in the view of the group’s 
spokesman Sanda Ould Boumama, the demolition of every mausoleum in the city of 
Timbuktu, considered as haram (forbidden) and idolatrous in that they represented the local 
Sufi version of Islam.85  
 
Depending on which theologian’s arguments an authoritative body decides to follow, the 
Hisbah may either legalise mausoleums and the veneration of tombs, or forbid such practices 
and hence destroy them. In Mali Ansar Dine clearly followed the puritanical Wahhabi 
interpretation which entailed respecting the principle of taswiyat al-qubur or levelling of 
tombs to the ground. However, as noted above, this issue was neglected by the Trial Camber 
in Al Mahdi. While this may be justified as a guilty plea had already been made, a discussion 
of Islamic defences could have, perhaps, placated a number of States who view the Court as a 
Western imperialist institution. A discussion of the rationale for the destruction of the cultural 
property from the Islamic perspective could indeed have also enlightened the discussion on 
the rationales for the protection of cultural property mentioned above. It is clear that in the 
present case, cultural property was destroyed, not because it was civilian and therefore, non-
military property, but rather because it represented a certain religion / culture. Thus, the 
destruction had a culture-value rationale. It is submitted that a culture-value rationale for the 
protection of such property therefore makes sense as the rationale for the potential destruction 
can be linked to the rationale for protection. 
 
 
 
IV The Case of Prosecutor v Al Mahdi 
A Case Facts 
                                                 
85 See: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18657463>.  
17 
 
The Malian government, which had ratified the Rome Statute in 2000, referred the ‘situation 
in Mali since January 2012’ to the OTP which began a preliminary examination of the 
Situation in Mali on 13 July 2012.86 An arrest warrant was issued against Al Mahdi on 18 
September 201587 in respect of the intentional directing of attacks against historic monuments 
and/or buildings dedicated to religion, including nine mausoleums and one mosque in 
Timbuktu, between about 30 June 2012 and 10 July 2012 and he was surrendered to the ICC 
by the Republic of Niger on 26 September 2015. He made his initial appearance before the 
Court on 30 September 201588 and the Document containing Charges was filed by the 
Prosecutor on 17 December 2015,89 containing a single charge alleging that Al Mahdi was 
responsible for the war crime of attacking protected objects under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the 
Statute.90 The Confirmation of Charges hearing took place in March 2016 and the charges 
were confirmed on March 24 with Al Mahdi being committed to trial.91 During this hearing 
he informed the Court of his intention to plead guilty to the charges.92 The trial was held 
between 22 and 24 August 2016,93 during which he made an admission of guilt. The 
judgment was issued on 27 September and Al Mahdi was sentenced to 9 years in prison.94 
 
B The Destruction of Cultural Property in Timbuktu 
The incidents of which Al Mahdi was found guilty took place in the city of Timbuktu 
between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012. The city had been under the control of a number of 
fundamentalist Islamic groups, including AQIM and Ansar Dine, between early April 2012 
and January 2013.95 These groups had set up administrative structures in the town, including 
                                                 
86 See letter of referral from the Malian Minister for Justice to the Prosecutor, 13 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-BFD1-45B6-891C-
3BCB5B173F57/0/ReferralLetterMali130712.pdf. 
87 Arrest Warrant, Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-1-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18 September 2015. 
88 ICC-01/12/01/15-T-1-ENG. 
89 ICC-01/12-01/15-62, ICC-01/12-01/15-63 and –AnxA (Arabic translation); ICC-01/12-01/15-70 and –AnxA-
Corr (English translation). 
90 Chef d’accusation retenu par l’Accusation contre Ahmad AL FAQI AL MAHDI, 17 December 2015, ICC-
01/12-01/15-62. 
91 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 2016.  
92 See ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following admission of 
guilt by the accused in Mali war crime case: ‘An important step for the victims, and another first for the ICC’’, 
24 March 2016, available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160324-otp-stat-al-Mahdi>. 
93 ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-5-Red-ENG, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-6-ENG.   
94 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Verdict and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016. 
95 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 3-5; Video of Ouman Ould Hamaha speaking about 
Ansar Dine’s control of Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0018-0352, from 00:00:00 to 00:00:41, MLI-OTP-0033-5448 
(full French transcript); Video of Ansar Dine at Timbuktu airport, MLI-OTP-0018-0345; Video of Ansar Dine’s 
flag at Timbuktu airport, MLI-OTP-0018-0195; Video of interview with Ansar Dine’s member from the airport 
of Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0018-0197 (Transcript, MLI-OTP-0033-5436); Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-
0019-R01, 0059-0063; Statement by P-66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0299, 0304-06.   
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Islamic police, an Islamic tribunal, the Hisbah,96 and a media commission.97 Al Mahdi was 
involved in various aspects of the Ansar Dine and AQIM administration and was in direct 
contact with the leaders of these groups, including Iyad Ag Ghaly (Ansar Dine leader), Abou 
Zeid (who governed Timbuktu under the armed groups), Yahia Abou Al Hammam (an AQIM 
chief) and Abdullah Al Chinguetti (a religious scholar and member of AQIM). He was 
regarded as an expert in the field of religion and was consulted by these groups on religious 
issues, and also contributed to the Islamic tribunal.98 His main role, however, was as head of 
the Hisbah from its foundation in April 2012 until September 2012.99 In this position, he 
wrote a document outlining the role and objectives of the Hisbah which was then distributed 
among the other occupying structures.100 According to the Trial Chamber, the Hisbah ‘was 
entrusted with regulating the morality of the people of Timbuktu, and of preventing, 
suppressing and repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible 
vice.’101  
In June 2012 Ag Ghaly, after consultation with other Islamic leaders in the region, decided to 
destroy the mausoleums in Timbuktu.102 While Al Mahdi put forward the proposition that all 
Islamic jurists agree on the prohibition of any construction over a tomb, he nevertheless 
recommended to not destroy the mausoleums in order to maintain a good relationship 
between the occupying groups and the local population.103 In spite of this advice Ag Ghaly 
gave orders to proceed with the destruction of mausoleums to Abou Zeid, and he in turn 
informed Al Mahdi in his role as head of the Hisbah.104 According to the Plea Agreement 
between the OTP and the Counsel for the Defence, despite Al Mahdi’s initial reservations 
about these attacks he nevertheless acquiesced immediately once he received the order to 
                                                 
96 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 7; First Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-54-Conf-
AnxA, pp. 4 and 5 (facts 14-20); Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-R01, 0050; Sahara Media press 
article, MLI-OTP-0015-0406.   
97 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 2016, 
para 31. 
98 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 6-7, 18-19; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-
0019-R01, 0050-53, para. 163; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0024-3096-R01, 3109-12; Video, MLI-OTP-
0009-1749, from 00:09:40:00 to 00:10:19:00.   
99 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 8, 11; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-
R01, 0050, para. 151. 
100 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 11; Statement by Mr Al Mahdi, MLI-OTP-0033-
4833, 4852; MLI-OTP-0033-4598, 4606.   
101 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15, 27 September 2016, 
at para. 33. 
102 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 38.   
103 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 37; Second Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-83-
Conf-AnxA, p. 2 (fact 51).   
104 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 24, 38-40.   
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destroy them.105 He thus wrote a sermon on the destruction of the mausoleums which was 
read out at Friday prayer106 and devised the order of destruction of these structures.107 He 
declared publicly that the decision to attack the sites was purposefully taken, stating ‘nous 
agissons ainsi parce que nous voulons le demolition des dȏmes.’108 He also proclaimed that 
the destruction of the domes had been ordered by ‘le Messager’ and that the destruction was 
not prohibited by the religious sources which he had consulted.109 The Hisbah also decided 
on the modalities of destruction and provided the financial and operational resources to carry 
out the attacks. Al Mahdi even decided the order in which the sites were to be attacked.110 He 
also personally participated in the attacks and / or facilitated the attacks. In some attacks he 
used a pickaxe to undertake destruction himself while at other sites he supervised the attacks, 
providing tools and preparing drinks for others.111  
 
In all, 10 of the most important cultural sites in Timbuktu were attacked and destroyed by Al 
Mahdi and others as part of the same common plan. These were:  
(i) The Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum.112 
(ii) The Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum.113 
                                                 
105 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 40.   
106 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 44; Second Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-83-
Conf-AnxA, p. 3 (fact 54); Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0358 (Translated transcript, MLI-OTP-0025-0330, 0332).   
107 Agreement ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 45, 54. Second Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-83-
Conf-AnxA, p. 3 (fact 57); Statement by Mr Al Mahdi, MLI-OTP-0033-4645, 4659-60, 4666, 4726.   
108 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 
2016, para 49. 
109 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 
2016, para 49. 
110 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 
2016, para 50. 
111 Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 24 March 
2016, para 51.  The Pre-Trial Chamber stated: ‘In addition to the role played by Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi in the 
administrative structures ... [he] personally participated in or assisted to the material execution of the destruction 
of several Buildings/Structures. He participated in some instances using a pickaxe and was involved in the 
destructions at all four cemeteries concerned by supervising the work, giving advice, and ‘preparing drinks and 
supervising the work, as well as providing the tools [...] including the pickaxes.’ He provided the means for the 
destruction of the door at the Sidi Yahia Mosque and contributed in pulling out the door, and finally approved of 
the destruction of the domes adjacent to the Djingareyber Mosque, in which he participated himself at the 
beginning using a pickaxe, and later approved the use of a bulldozer.’ 
112 This was destroyed on 30 June 2012, with Mr Al Mahdi in attendance at the site. Agreement, ICC-01/12-
01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 61-63; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-R01, 0066-68 (Videos MLI-
OTP-0018-0354, MLI-OTP-0018-0360, MLI-OTP-0018-0363, MLI-OTP-0018-0375); Statement by P-66, 
MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0333-34 (Videos MLI-OTP-0012-1782, MLI-OTP-0012-1784), 0344-45 (Videos 
MLI-OTP-0001-6926, MLI-OTP-0001-7037 at 00:45:17 to 00:45:26); Report of Expert Witness P-75, MLI-
OTP-0033-0140, 143-46, 0166-68, 0183-84; Statement by P-125, MLI-OTP-0023-0004-R01, 0018.   
113 This was destroyed on 30 June 2012. Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 64-65; 
Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0761-67; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-
R01, 0068; Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0353; Report of Expert Witness P-75, MLI-OTP-0033-0140, 0165-66; 
Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0353; UNESCO’s Study on the mausoleums of Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0015-0081, 0086.   
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(iii) The Sheik Sidi El Mokhtar Ben SIdi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum.114 
(iv) The Alpha Moya Mausoleum.115 
(v) The Sheik Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum.116 
(vi) The Sheik Abdoul Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum.117 
(vii) The Sheik Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum.118 
(viii) The door of the Sidi Yahia Mosque.119 
                                                 
114 Mr Al Mahdi supervised its destruction on 30 June 2012. While he was at the site he informed journalists that 
‘if a tomb is higher than the others, it must be levelled […] we are going to rid the landscape of anything that is 
out of place.’ Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 66-72; Photograph, Malian 
Government, MLI-OTP-0009-1526; Malian Government’s illustrated list of mausoleums and cemeteries, MLI-
OTP-0001-7116, 7118; Statement by P-114, MLI-OTP-0023-0344-R01, 0364; Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 
and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1196-99; Malian Government’s Intelligence Bulletin on security situation in 
northern Mali, MLI-OTP-0012-0462, 0463-64; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0676-
82; Statement by P-125, MLI-OTP-0023-0004-R01, 0018-19, 0041; Video, MLI-OTP-0011-0459, from 
00:00:00 to 00:00:08; UNESCO Director-General calls for a halt to destruction of cultural heritage sites in 
Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0001-1944.   
115 This was destroyed on 30 June 2012 with the direct participation of Mr Al Mahdi. Agreement, ICC-01/12-
01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 73-78; Malian Government’s illustrated list of mausoleums and cemeteries, 
MLI-OTP-0001-7116; Photographs, Malian Government, MLI-OTP-0009-1508, MLI-OTP-0009-1509, MLI-
OTP-0009-1513; Statement by P-125, MLI-OTP-0023-0004-R01, 0043; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-
OTP-0028-0586, 0685-95; Statement by P-66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0334-36; Videos, MLI-OTP-0012-
1792, MLI-OTP-0012-1793, MLI-OTP-0012-1787, MLI-OTP-0012-1789; Second Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-
01/15-83-Conf-AnxA, page 4 (fact 69); Video, MLI-OTP-0001-7037 from 00:45:01:19 to 00:45:07:16; Report 
of Expert Witness P-75, MLI-OTP-0033-0140, 0146, 0184-85; Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-
OTP-0029-1138, 1187-95.   
116 This was destroyed on 1 July 2012. Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 85-86; 
Photographs, Malian Government, MLI-OTP-0009-1495, MLI-OTP-0009-1562; Malian government’s 
illustrated list of mausoleums and cemeteries, MLI-OTP-0001-7116; Statement by P-114, MLI-OTP-0023-
0344-R01, 0365-66, paras. 78-80; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0657-67; Video, 
MLI-OTP-0012-1811; Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1165-68; Photographs, 
MLI-OTP-0006-2243 to MLI-OTP-0006-2258.   
117 This was destroyed on 1 July 2012. Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 87-88; Report 
of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0647-56; Photograph, Malian Government, MLI-OTP-0009-
1498; Statement by P-114, MLI-OTP-0023-0344-R01, 0366; Statement by P-66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 
0337-39; Video, MLI-OTP-0012-1801; Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1169-
72.   
118 This was destroyed on 1 July 2012 with the direct participation of Mr Al Mahdi. Agreement, ICC-01/12-
01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 82-84; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0637-46; 
Malian Government’s illustrated list of mausoleums and cemeteries, MLI-OTP-0001-7116; Statement by P-125, 
MLI-OTP-0023-0004-R01, 0021, 0029-40; Videos, MLI-OTP-0018-0366, MLI-OTP-0018-0374; Report of 
Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1173-77.   
119 This was destroyed on 2 July 2012. A legend attached to this door to the effect that opening it would lead to 
the Last Judgment and it had not been opened in 500 years. Mr Al Mahdi went to the site with pickaxes, bought 
with Hisbah funds, to open the door. While the destruction was taking place Mr Al Mahdi explained to 
journalists: 
‘What you see here is one of the ways of eradicating superstition, heresy and all things or subterfuge which can 
lead to idolatry. We heard about a door in the ancient mosque of Sidi Yahya. If it is opened, the Day of 
Resurrection will begin. Following an investigation, we discovered that it was a condemned door in the 
courtyard of an old mosque. The door was condemned and bricked up. Over time, a myth took hold, claiming 
that the Day of Resurrection would begin if the door were opened. We fear that these myths will invade the 
beliefs of people and the ignorant who, because of their ignorance and their distance from religion, will think 
that this is the truth. So we decided to open it.’ Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 89-95; 
Malian government’s communication, MLI-OTP-0012-0259; Malian government’s Intelligence Bulletin on the 
situation in Timbuktu, MLI-OTP-0012-0260; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0024-0537, 0557-65; 
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(ix) The Bahaber Babadié Mausoleum and (x) The Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum, both 
adjoining the Djingareyber Mosque.120 
These sites were either fully or partially destroyed by individuals using a variety of weapons, 
including pickaxes and iron bars. All but one site was classified as world heritage and 
protected by the UNESCO 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage.121 
 
The Court found beyond reasonable doubt that Al Mahdi’s admission of guilt, together with 
the additional evidence presented, satisfied the essential facts to prove the crime charged. In 
this regard the Chamber found that the Plea Agreement and Al Mahdi’s admissions were 
‘both credible and reliable in full.’122 Al Mahdi was thus convicted, pursuant to Articles 
8(2)(e)(iv), 25(3)(a) and 65(2) of the ICC Statute, as a co-perpetrator for attacking 10 
projected objects in Timbuktu between around 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012. The Chamber 
then sentenced him to 9 years in prison.123  
 
V Analysis 
Despite the fact that Article 8 of the ICC Statute contains “a civilian use approach” in respect 
of the rationale for the protection of cultural property, the OTP and the Chamber frequently 
referred to the importance of cultural property to humanity throughout various stages of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1151-57; Statement by P-125, MLI-OTP-
0023-0004-R01, 0022-23, 0031-35; Statement by P-65, MLI-OTP-0020-0019-R01, 0070-71; Statement by P-
66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0340-41; Videos, MLI-OTP-0012-1918, MLI-OTP-0012-1919; Report of Expert 
Witness P-75, MLI-OTP-0033-0140, 0160-61, 0190-93; Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0212; Statement by P-65, MLI-
OTP-0020-0019-R01, 0071-72; Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0149 (Translated transcript, MLI-OTP-0024-2954, 
2958-59), Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0209 (Translated transcript, MLI-OTP-0033-5439, 5441).   
120 These were destroyed on or around 10-11 July 2012. Mr Al Mahdi was asked to attack these mausoleums by 
Mr Al Chinguetti and he oversaw the attacks, deciding at one point that a bulldozed should be used to aid 
destruction. Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, paras. 96-103; Malian Government’s illustrated 
list of mausoleums and cemeteries, MLI-OTP-0001-7116, 7118; Photographs, MLI-OTP-0009-1478, MLI-
OTP-0009-1483; Report of Expert Witness P-104, MLI-OTP-0028-0586, 0729-39; Statement by P-125, MLI-
OTP-0023-0004-R01, 0036; Video, MLI-OTP-0018-0148, especially 00:04:11:00–00:04:55:00, 00:07:35:00–
00:08:28:00; First Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-54-Conf-AnxA, page 6 (fact 36); Statement by P-65, MLI-
OTP-0020-0019-R01, 0073-74; Videos, MLI-OTP-0018-0334, MLI-OTP-0018-0336, MLI-OTP-0018-0341; 
Report of Expert Witness P-75, MLI-OTP-0033-0140, 0163-65; Video, MLI-OTP-0012-1815; Statement by P-
66, MLI-OTP-0019-0296-R01, 0343; Second Agreed Facts, ICC-01/12-01/15-83-Conf-AnxA, p. 4 (fact 73); 
Report of Expert Witnesses P-55 and P-57, MLI-OTP-0029-1138, 1158-64; Photograph, MLI-OTP-0018-2281.   
121 Agreement, ICC-01/12-01/15-78-Anx1-tENG-Red, para. 33; UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention 
Nomination Documentation, MLI-OTP-0004-0321; UNESCO’s World heritage sites in Mali, MLI-OTP-0013-
3630, 3715-26; Report of the World Heritage Committee, MLI-OTP-0006-3298, 3314; UNESCO’s international 
experts meeting for the safeguarding of Mali’s cultural heritage, MLI-OTP-0006-3459; P-151 testimony, ICC-
01/12-01/15-T-5-Red-ENG, p. 53, line 17, to p. 55, line 23; Statement by P-151, MLI-OTP-0029-0843-R01, 
0861.   
122 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 44. 
123 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 109. 
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case.  The Prosecutor’s discussion of cultural property illustrates “a culture-value approach” 
as to why attacks on cultural property should be criminalised, i.e. because such attacks are 
essentially an attack on cultural identity and on the people to which the culture belongs. For 
example, at the Confirmation of Charges hearing, the Prosecutor commented that: ‘[t]he 
destruction of such monuments constitutes the annihilation of structures that had survived the 
ravages of time and which stood as testimony to Timbuktu's glorious past and important 
place in history and to its people over generations.’124 
The Chamber took a similar approach in its Judgment. It focused on the status of 9 of the 
attacked sites as UNESCO World Heritage sites and found that destruction of sites of this 
status ‘appears to be of particular gravity as their destruction does not only affect the direct 
victims of the crimes, namely the faithful and inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people 
throughout Mali and the international community.’125 In this context the Chamber recalled 
evidence given by the Malian expert in cultural matter who had testified that ‘destroying the 
mausoleums, to which the people of Timbuktu had an emotional attachment, was a war 
activity aimed at breaking the soul of the people of Timbuktu.’126 The Chamber also recalled 
a UNESCO expert’s testimony that ‘the entire international community, in the belief that 
heritage is part of cultural life, is suffering as a result of the destruction of the protected 
sites.’127 The Chamber thus concluded that targeted sites were not simply religious buildings 
‘but had also a symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of Timbuktu is relevant in 
assessing the gravity of the crime committed,’128 thus emphasising both the civilian use and 
culture-value characteristics of the property.  
While Article 8 prohibits attacks on cultural property as a war crime as a result of its civilian 
use nature, the Chamber implies that its culture-value nature will be an issue to be analysed in 
the context of gravity, which can be taken into consideration in respect of admissibility and 
sentencing. This further confuses the already uncertain legal framework concerning the 
rationales for protection of cultural property. However, given the fact that Al Mahdi had 
pleaded guilty, the nature of the offence did not garner a lot of attention in the Trial Chamber. 
Indeed, the Chamber did not seek to clarify previous jurisprudence on this point from the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal, commenting that it ‘is of limited guidance given that, in contrast to the 
                                                 
124 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the opening of the 
confirmation of charges hearing in the case against Mr Ahmad Al-Faqi Al Mahdi, 1 March 2016. 
125 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 80. 
126 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 80. 
127 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 80. 
128 The Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 September 2016, para. 79. 
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Statute, its applicable law does not govern ‘attacks’ against cultural objects but rather 
punishes their ‘destruction or wilful damage’. The legal contexts thus differ.’129  
 
Thus, clarification in the area is still awaited. A number of scholars have commented on how 
the ICC might deal with the issue of cultural property in the future. Frulli comments, in the 
context of the ICC Statute, that ‘a more specific cultural-value oriented approach to the 
criminalization of acts against cultural property committed in times of armed conflict would 
be coherent with the overall developments in the field of international criminal law, 
constantly evolving into a more sophisticated body of law.’130 In a similar vein, seeking to 
broaden the prosecution base for attacks on cultural property to include crimes against 
humanity, Martínez states that ‘[e]ven though the definition of the crime against humanity of 
persecution does not make explicit reference to cultural property, it can be applied to sanction 
the destruction of cultural property, it can be applied to sanction the destruction of cultural 
property...’131 In this vein, the International Law Commission has stated that ‘[p]ersecution 
may take many forms, for example, a prohibition on practicing certain kinds of religious 
worship; prolonged and systematic detention of individuals who represent a political, 
religious or cultural group; a prohibition on the use of a national language even in private; 
systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular social, 
religious, cultural or other group.’132 The acceptance of the destruction of cultural property as 
a crime against humanity would, of course, most importantly, allow for the prosecution of 
such destruction during peace time. It is submitted that this broader understanding of attacks 
on cultural property is to be preferred to the very narrow “civilian use approach” incorporated 
into the text of the ICC Statute. It is also submitted that future ICC cases would need to 
clarify both the rationales for protection of cultural property in addition to the potential status 
of attacks on cultural property as a crime against humanity or an element of genocide in order 
to bring much needed clarification to this issue. 
 
Connected to the issue of rationales for the protection of cultural property is the rationale for 
the destruction of cultural property,however, the Chamber gave this issue scant attention in 
                                                 
129 Situation in the Republic of Mail in the Case of The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Judgment and 
Sentence, No.: ICC-01/12-01/15, 27 September 2016, para. 16. 
130 Micaela Frulli, ‘The Criminalization of Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The 
Quest for Consistency’ (2011) 22(1) European Journal of International Law, 203, 216. 
131 See Sebastián A Green Martínez, ‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali’ (2016) 15(4) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 1, 7. 
132 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991,V.I (1991), at 294. 
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its judgment and refrained from examining the Islamic concept of hisbah, a term which was 
employed 48 times in the Confirmation of Charges by the prosecution, the defendnat and 
judges themselves.133 While Al Mahdi pleaded guilty and apologised for his actions prior to 
the Trial, his Defence Team had made statements providing justifications for his actions in 
directing these attacks and had hinted that Al Mahdi’s actions were of a political rather than a 
criminal nature. His lawyer, Jean-Louis Gilissen, stated that Al Mahdi ‘was concerned about 
the common good and concerned about doing what is right, wanted to make a contribution to 
introducing what he was taught and what he had understood was the divine message, 
concerned with doing what is right...’134 Gilissen went on to comment that ‘[w]e’re talking 
about two visions of the world that are in contradiction.’135  However, given the guilty plea, 
the Defence did not identify any grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 
31 of the Statute. The Chamber also found that there are no viable affirmative defences.136 
However, the Chamber could have opted to analyse in greater depth the possibility of raising 
and applying cultural defences before the Court or indeed could have assessed Al Mahdi’s 
actions as a potential mistake of law, giving that he was acting pursuant to Islamic law which 
called for the destruction of cultural property. Rather, the Chamber noted that religious 
motivations were behind the destruction of the sites, stating that ‘[t]he creation of the Hesbah, 
which was headed by Al Mahdi, was meant precisely to eradicate any visible vice it identified 
in Timbuktu.’137 The Chamber thus found that the discriminatory religious motivations 
underpinning the destruction of the sites was a relevant factor in its assessment of the gravity 
of the crime.  
The question which was ignored by the Chamber and will definitely arise in future cases 
before the ICC was whether the defendant had any justifications for the attacks under Islamic 
law, the legal system to which he was subject at the time? In this context, it could be argued 
that the concepts of ziyara and hisbah justified the destruction of cultural property at least 
from the defendant perspective. 
 
VI Conclusion 
Given the current extensive destruction of cultural property by various Islamist extremist 
groups, a broader understanding of cultural property, its importance to humanity, and a robust 
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international criminal law response to attacks on such property is needed. Furthermore, 
additional attention on why cultural property is targeted by Islamist extremist groups is 
needed in order to offer it better protection. Unfortunately, the Trial Chamber missed an 
opportunity in Al Mahdi to pay adequate attention to this issue or to seek clarification on the 
subject from an Islamic law expert. While Al Mahdi was found guilty of violating Article 8 
of the ICC Statute which incorporates a civilian use understanding of cultural property, the 
Chamber focused a lot of attention on the culture-value nature of cultural property when 
discussing the gravity of the crime committed and failed to discuss ICTY jurisprudence on 
attacks on cultural property as crimes against humanity or as evidence of genocide. 
Therefore, further clarification on these issues is needed in future ICC cases on this topic.  
 
In respect of the failure to address the issues of hisbah and Islamic justifications for 
destruction of cultural property, perhaps this is a more understandable omission, given the 
fact that Al Mahdi pleaded guilty. However, there have been many legitimate condemnations 
of the western origins and nature of international (criminal) law and its application by 
international criminal courts and tribunals, particular the ICC. The question thus arises, in 
what way can other legal systems be recognized by the Court, or what can be the contribution 
of the knowledge on these systems for the international legal community?  Unfortunately, the 
answer to this question is still pending, as the discussion of the protection and destruction of 
cultural property by Al Mahdi was incomplete. 
